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Abstract
Cooperative investments in R&D are a signiﬁcant driving force of the
modern economy. As it well-known, the R&D investments are uncertain
and the strategic alliances create synergies and additional information
that increase the success probabilities about R&D projects.
The theory of real option games takes into account both the ﬂexibility
value of an investment opportunity and the strategic considerations. In
particular way, while the non-cooperative options are exercised in the in-
terest of the option holders’ payoﬀs, the cooperative ones are exercised in
order to maximize the total partnership value.
In our model we develop an interaction between two ﬁrms that invest in
R&D and we show the eﬀects of cooperative synergies on several equilibri-
ums. Moreover, we consider that the R&D investments are characterized
by positive network externalities that induce more beneﬁts in case of re-
ciprocal R&D success.
Keywords: Real Exchange Options; Cooperation games; Information
Revelation; R&D investments.
JEL Classiﬁcation: G13; C71; D80; O32.
1 Introduction
In recent years, the real option theory has been widely used in evaluating investment
decisions in a dynamic environment. The market developments are complex and so
the conventional NPV (Net Present Value) rule undervalues the value of a project
because this method fails to take into account the market uncertainty, irreversibility
of investment and ability to delay entry. So, a ﬁrm with an opportunity to invest is
holding an “option” like to ﬁnancial options. As it is well accepted, the real option
theory becomes very important as it allows to capture the value of managerial ﬂexi-
bility to grow, delay or abandon projects.
Several models, such as [Shackleton and Wojakowski (2003)], [Trigeorgis (1991)] and
[Lee (1997)] and so on, are based on the assumption that the option exercise price,
and so the investement cost, is ﬁxed. But, particularly for the R&D investments, it
is reasonable to consider that the evolution of the investment cost is uncertain. So,
1the R&D invesment opportunity corresponds to an exchange option and not to sim-
ple call option: it’s the exchange of an uncertain investment cost for an uncertain
gross project value. The most importants models that value exchange options are
given in [Margrabe (1978)], [McDonald and Siegel (1985)], [Carr(1988)], [Carr(1995)]
and [Armada et al.(2007)]. In particular way, [McDonald and Siegel (1985)] value a
simple European exchange option while [Carr(1988)] develops a model to value a com-
pound European exchange option. Both models consider that assets distribute “divi-
dends”that, in real options context, are the opportunity costs if an investment project
is postponed ([Majd and Pindyck (1987)]).
In addition, the real option approach, combined with game theory, allows to consider
the strategic interactions among real option holders and also the market dynamics.
The ﬁnancial options literature does not consider the strategic policies because the
option exercise does not inﬂuence the characteristic of the underlying security or the
options themselves. Diﬀerently, real investment opportunities are not held by one ﬁrm
in isolation and so, the optimal strategic exercise can be derived considering the in-
teractions across option holders.
In this paper we analyse a cooperation between two ﬁrms that invest in R&D. In par-
ticular way, following [Dias and Teixeira(2004)] and [Dias (2004)] models, we assume
that the R&D investments generate an “information revelation” about their success
and so, by delaying an investment decision, new information can be revealed that might
aﬀect the proﬁtability of the R&D projects. So by the alliance between two players,
we show as the information is wholly revealed and captured by two ﬁrms to improve
their R&D success probabilities. The mutual information gain implies positive net-
work externalities (as it is shown in [Kong and Kwok (2007)] and [Huisman (2001)])
which lead more beneﬁts in case of reciprocal R&D success. Therefore, the externali-
ties can involve diﬀerent entry decisions and so to induce the cooperation between two
ﬁrms in order to maximixe the partnership return. Accordingly to positive network
externalities, we introduce the growth market coeﬃcients depending by the success or
failure of two players.
Moreover, we consider that the R&D investment is realized in a two stage manner,
with the commencement of second phase being dependent on the successful completion
of the ﬁrst one. This is known as sequential investment in which each stage provides
information for the next thus creating an opportunity (option) for subsequent invest-
ment.
This article is suitable to model joint ventures of car producers, alliance between phar-
maceutical and oil companies and other cooperation kinds that involve a reduction of
R&D risk. For istance, [Kogut(1991)], [Chi(2000)] demonstrated the power of view-
ing joint ventures as real options to expand in response to future technological and
market developments. We diﬀerentiate from [Dias and Teixeira(2004)], [Kogut(1991)]
and [Chi(2000)] because we use exchange options to value the R&D opportunities at
initial time and so to determine the best cooperative strategies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the Simple and Compound eu-
ropean exchange option pricing models and Section 3 introduces the basic model and
derives also the ﬁnal payoﬀs of two ﬁrms in a non cooperative framework. Section 4
analyses the cooperation between two ﬁrms and we show how both ﬁrms can split the
surplus of cooperation and, in Section 5, we present two numerical examples for the
cooperative R&D game. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
22 Exchange Options Methodology
In this section we present the ﬁnal results of the principal models to value European
exchange options.
2.1 Simple european exchange option (SEEO)
[McDonald and Siegel (1985)]’s model gives the value of a SEEO to exchange asset D
for asset V at time T. The asset given up is termed the delivery asset while the asset
received is the optioned asset. Denoting with s(V,D,T −t) the value of SEEO at time
t, the ﬁnal payoﬀ at the option’s maturity date T is s(V,D,0) = max[0,VT − DT].
So, assuming that V and D follow a geometric Brownian motion process given by:
dV
V
= (µv − δv)dt + σvdZv (1a)
dD
D









= ρvdσvσd dt (1c)
where:
• V and D are the Gross Project Value and the Investment Cost, respectively;
• µv and µd are the equilibrium expected rate of return on asset V , and the
expected growth rate of the investment cost;
• δv and δd are the “dividend-yields”of V and D, respectively;
• Zv and Zd are the brownian standard motions of asset V and D;
• σv and σd are the volatility of V and D, respectively;
• ρvd is the correlation between changes in V and D.
[McDonald and Siegel (1985)] show that the value of a SEEO on dividend-paying as-
sets, when the valuation date t = 0, is given by:
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; d2 = d1 − σ
√
T ;
• N(d) is the cumulative standard normal distribution.
2.2 Compound european exchange option (CEEO)
If the underlying asset is another option, the option is called compound. [Carr(1988)]
develops a model to value the CEEO c(s,ϕD,t1) whose ﬁnal payoﬀ at maturity date
t1 is:
c(s,ϕD,0) = max[0,s − ϕD]
3The CEEO value, considering the valuation date t = 0, is given by:






























• ϕ is the exchange ratio of CEEO;
• t1 is the expiration date of the CEEO;
• T is the expiration date of the SEEO, where T > t1














































∗,τ)) = ϕ. (4)
• N2(a,b,ρ) is the standard bivariate normal distribution function evaluated at
a and b with correlation coeﬃcient ρ.
3 The Basic Model Game
In our model we consider two ﬁrms (A and B) that have the option to realize their
R&D investment at initial time t0 or to delay the decision at time t1. As it is know,
the R&D investments depends on the resolution of several source of uncertainty that
may inﬂuence the investment decision of each ﬁrm. Assuming by q and p the R&D
success probability of ﬁrms A and B respectively, we can represent this situation by








0 1 − p
The R&D success or failure of one ﬁrm generates an information revelation that inﬂu-
ences the investment decision of the other ﬁrm. So, if ﬁrm A’s R&D is successful, the
ﬁrm B’s probability p changes in positive information revelation p
+, while p changes
in negative information revelation p
− in case of A’s failure. Simmetrically, the ﬁrm
A’s R&D success changes in q
+ or in q
− in case of success or failure of ﬁrm B at time
t0. Following [Dias (2004)]’s model about the information revelation process, it results
that:
4p






p(1 − p) · ρ(X,Y ) (5a)
p






p(1 − p) · ρ(X,Y ) (5b)
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q(1 − q) · ρ(Y,X) (5c)
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q(1 − q) · ρ(Y,X) (5d)
where the correlations ρ(X,Y ) and ρ(Y,X) are a measure of information revelation
from Y to X and from X to Y , respectively. Obviously, the information revelation is
considerable when the investment is not realized in the same time. So, if both players
invest simultaneously in R&D ore they wait to invest, ther is not information revela-






The information revelation is a public information process accessible to the other com-
petitors that inﬂuences their choices. For istance, it is known that good information
about drugs is available in pharmaceutical industry after clinical testing, and so in the
ﬁrst stages of R&D.
The condition to respect to have 0 ≤ p
+ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ p
− ≤ 1 according to the positive
information revelation that beneﬁts the ﬁrm B, namely ρ(X,Y ) ≥ 0 is that:










The condition (6) must to be respected also for the information revelation process that
beneﬁts ﬁrm A, namely ρ(Y,X), to have that 0 ≤ q
+ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ q
− ≤ 1.
So, with the alliance between A and B, we can assume that information is wholly











We can observe that in the symmetrical case in which both ﬁrms have the same success
probability p = q, then it results ρmax = 1 and so q
+ = 1 and p
+ = 1. This means
that, in case of A’s R&D success at time t0, it involves the B’s success at time t1
in the cooperation treatment since the information revelation is fully captured and
vice-versa.
Moreover, we assume that R&D investments are characterized by network externalities
that induce more beneﬁts in case of reciprocal R&D success. So we denote by:
K0S0S, K0S1S, K1S0S, K1S1S
the growth market coeﬃcients in case of A and B success. The 0 and 1 mean that
the R&D investment is realized at time t0 or t1 respectively, while the S denotes the
success. The ﬁrst part denotes the operation of considered ﬁrm, while the second
part is the situation of the other ﬁrm. So, if A and B invest successfully in R&D at
5time t0 and t1 respectively, ﬁrm A takes K0S1S while B obtains K1S0S. If both ﬁrms
invest simultaneously with success at time t0, then they will take K0S0S, while if the
investments are realized at time t1 they will have K1S1S. In the same way we denote by:
K0S0F , K0S1F , K1S0F , K1S1F
the market coeﬃcients for the winning ﬁrm assuming the failure, denoted by F, by
the other player. Moreover, as the unsuccess of one player does not produce network
externaility, we can write that:
K0S0F = K0S1F ≡ K0S; K1S0F = K1S1F ≡ K1S
Finally, in case of failure of considered ﬁrm, its market coeﬃcient will be equal to zero
whether in case of success or failure of other ﬁrm. So we have that:
K0F 0S = 0, K0F 1S = 0, K1F 0S = 0, K1F 1S = 0
and
K0F 0F = 0, K0F 1F = 0, K1F 0F = 0, K1F 1F = 0
Now, we can set the relations among the growth market coeﬃcients K using these
assumptions:
• Positive Network Externality: as it is shown [Huisman (2001)], the growth mar-
ket coeﬃcient in case of both R&D success will be bigger than the situation in
which only one ﬁrm invests successfully, and so:
KSS > KS (8a)
• R&D Success Time: the market coeﬃcient increases if the reciprocal R&D suc-
cess is realized at time t0 rather than t1, because there is more time to beneﬁt
both network externalities and R&D innovations. In the situation in which only
one ﬁrm invests successfully, the market coeﬃcient enlarges if the success is re-
alized at time t0 rather than t1:
K0S0S > K1S1S; K0S > K1S (8b)
• First Mover’s Advantage: the ﬁrm that realizes with success the R&D invest-
ment at time t0 will receive an higher market coeﬃcient than other player that
postpones successfully the project at time t1:
K0S1S > K1S0S; (8c)
To determine the growth market coeﬃcients K, we assume that they depend by a
parameter k involving the R&D innovation and by length of R&D beneﬁts until the
expiration time T. For the positive network externality, we take into account two
times the one ﬁrm market coeﬃcient. So, assuming that the initial time t0 = 0, we
have that:
K0S = kT (9a)
K0S0S = 2kT (9b)
K1S = k(T − t1) (9c)
K1S1S = 2k(T − t1) (9d)
6We suppose to ﬁx T, it is obviuos that if t1 decreasing, then the coeﬃcients K1S1S and
K1S increase their value. In fact, if t1 = 0 then there is not delay and K1S1S = K0S0S
and K1S = K0S. Finally, to determine K0S1S and K1S0S, we assume that:
K0S1S = 2k(T − t1) + kt1 (9e)
K1S0S = 2k(T − t1) − kt1 (9f)
If one ﬁrm invests successfully at time t0 and the other player at time t1, we have that
the ﬁrst ﬁrm takes the network externality starting from time t1, namely K1S1S plus
the ﬁrst mover’s advantatege kt1 until time t1. Simmetrically, the market coeﬃcient
K1S0S for the second ﬁrm that postpones its choice will be K1S1S minus kt1. We
can observe that if t1 = 0, so if there is not postponement, then K0S1S = K1S0S =
K0S0S. Finally, to ensure that condition (8a) holds, we need to impose that t1 <
T
3 .
This condition is reasonable with the consideration that the information revelation
disappears in time and furthermore, if one ﬁrm invests at time t0, the other ﬁrm
decision will be made within t1 <
T
3 to allow the realization of development phase in
T − t1.
First to start, we state as Leader the pionner ﬁrm (A or B) that invests in R&D at time
t0 earlier than other one, namely the Follower, that postpones the R&D investment
decision at time t1. We denote by R the R&D investment for the development of a new
product, V the overall market value deriving by R&D innovations and D is the total
investment cost to realize new goods. We consider that the production investment of
each ﬁrm is proportional to its market share and it can be realized only at time T,
that is the time needed for to develop the new product. Hence, we suppose that the
option to enter in the market is like an European exchange option.
3.1 The Leader’s Payoﬀ
We analyse the Leader’s payoﬀ assuming that ﬁrm A (Leader) invests in R&D at
time t0 while ﬁrm B (Follower) decides to wait to invest. So, the Leader spends the
investment R at time t0 and obtains, in case of its R&D success with probability q,
the development option. In particular way, if also the Follower’s R&D invesment is
successfully at time t1, the growth market coeﬃcient will be K0S1S and the Leader
holds the development option s(K0S1SV,K0S1SD,T) to invest K0S1SD and claims




A(V,D) = −R + q · s(K0S1SV,K0S1SD,T)







The probability to have K0S1S depending by the Follower’s R&D success that is p
+
since it receives the information revelation from Leader’s investment occurred at time
t0. But, if the Follower’s R&D fails, the Leader’s market coeﬃcient in case of its R&D
success is K0S and it receives the following payoﬀ:
L
F
A(V,D) = −R + q · s(K0SV,K0SD,T)







as it is shown in the Fig.(1(b)). So, computing the expectation value between Eqs.








7Simmetrically, assuming that ﬁrm B (Leader) invests at time t0 while ﬁrm A (Follower)


































(a) Leader’s payoﬀ in case of
Follower’s success
t

















(b) Leader’s payoﬀ in case of
Follower’s failure
Figure 1: Leader’s payoﬀs
3.2 The Follower’s Payoﬀ
Now we focus on the Follower’s payoﬀ assuming that ﬁrm B (Follower) decides to
postpone its R&D investment decision at time t1 and ﬁrm A (Leader) invests at time
t0. If the Leader’s R&D investment is successfully (with a probability q), then the
Follower’s probability success became p
+ and its growth market coeﬃcient is K1S0S.
So, after the investment R, the Follower holds with a probability p
+ the development
option s(K1S0SV,K1S0SD,τ) to invest K1S0SD and claims a market value equal to
K1S0SV . So the Follower’s payoﬀ at time t0 is a CEEO with maturity t1, exercise price
equal to R and the underlying asset is the development option s(K1S0SV,K1S0SD,τ)
as it is represented in the Fig.(2(a)).




According to [Carr(1988)]’s model, we assume that R = ϕD is a proportion ϕ of asset
D. Hence, denoting by c(p




we can write, using the Eq. (3), the value of CEEO with positive information:
c(p
+) = p






































upB is the critical value that makes the underlying asset of c(p
+) equal to
exercise value. Hence P
∗
upB solves the following equation:
p
+s(K1S0SV,K1S0SD,τ) = ϕD











p+ · (2T − 3t1)
(15)
Alternatively, in case of Leader’s failure, the Follower’s R&D success probability
changes in p
− and its market coeﬃcient is K1S. So, the Follower’s payoﬀ at time
t0 is a CEEO with maturity t1, exercise price equal to R and underlying asset is the
development option s(K1SV,K1SD,τ) as it is shown in the Fig.(2(b)). Hence, the









we can write, using the Eq. (3), the value of CEEO with negative information:
c(p
−) = p

















































p− · k(T − t1)
. (17)
The Follower obtains the CEEO c(p
+) in case of Leader’s success with a probability q
or the CEEO c(p
−) in case of Leader’s failure with a probability (1 − q). Hence, the
Follower’s payoﬀ at time t0 is the expectation value:
FB(V,D) = q c(p
+) + (1 − q)c(p
−) (18)
Similary, if we consider that ﬁrm B (Leader) invests in R&D at time t0 and ﬁrm A
(Follower) decides to wait to invest we have that:
FA(V,D) = pc(q






















































(b) Follower’s payoﬀ in case of
Leader’s failure
Figure 2: Follower’s payoﬀs
93.3 The A and B payoﬀs in case of simultaneous investment
In this case, we analyse the situation in which both ﬁrms invest in R&D at time
t0. We can assume that there is not information revelation since the investment
is simultaneous but both players can beneﬁce of network externalities. First of all,
we determine the ﬁrm’s A payoﬀ. Assuming the ﬁrm B’s R&D success, A receives
the development option with a growth market coeﬃcient K0S0S in case of its R&D
success. So, after the investment R at time t0, player A receives the development
option s(K0S0SV,K0S0SD,T) with a probability q:
S
S
A(V,D) = −R + q · s(K0S0SV,K0S0SD,T)







But, assuming the ﬁrm B failure, A receives the development option with a growth
market coeﬃcient K0S in case of its success:
S
F
A(V,D) = −R + q · s(K0SV,K0SD,T)







So, recalling that ﬁrm B’s probability success is equal to p, the ﬁrm’s A payoﬀ in case
of simultaneous investment will be the expectation value between Eqs. (20) and (21):
SA(V,D) = p · S
S
A(V,D) + (1 − p) · S
F
A(V,D) (22)
Simmetrically, the ﬁrm’s B payoﬀ will be:
SB(V,D) = q · S
S
B(V,D) + (1 − q) · S
F
B(V,D) (23)
3.4 The A and B payoﬀs when both ﬁrms wait to invest
Finally, we suppose that both ﬁrms decide to delay their R&D investment decision
at time t1 and we can setting that there is not information revelation. First of all,
we analyse the situation of ﬁrm A. Assuming the R&D success of ﬁrm B, then the
growth market coeﬃcient of player A will be K1S1S. So, after the investment R at time
t1, ﬁrm A holds with a probability q the development option s(K1S1SV,K1S1SD,τ)
to invest K1S1SD and claims a market value equal to K1S1SV . Then the ﬁrm’s A
payoﬀ at time t0 is a CEEO with maturity t1, the exercise price equal to R and the
underlying asset is the development option s(K1S1SV,K1S1SD,τ) with a probability
q. Thus, according to [Carr(1988)]’s model, and assuming that R is a proportion ϕ of
asset D, the CEEO in case of ﬁrm’s B success is:
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wsA is the critical value that solves the following equation:
q · s(K1S1SV,K1S1SD,τ) = ϕD











q · 2k(T − t1)
(26)
But, in case of ﬁrm’s B failure, the ﬁrm A growth market coeﬃcient will be K1S. So,
after the investment R at time t1, ﬁrm A obtains with a probability q the development
option s(K1SV,K1SD,τ). Thus, using [Carr(1988)]’s model, the ﬁrm’ A payoﬀ at time
t0 is a CEEO where the underlying asset is s(K1SV,K1SD,τ) with a probability q:
W
F







































where, as seen before, P
∗
wfA is the critical value that solves the following equation:
q · s(K1SV,D1SD,τ) = ϕD











q · k(T − t1)
(29)
Hence, recalling that the ﬁrm B success is equal to p, we can compute the ﬁrm A
payoﬀ as the expectation value between Eqs. (24) and (27):
WA(V,D) = pW
S
A(V,D) + (1 − p)W
F
A (V,D) (30)
Similary, the ﬁrm B payoﬀ is:
WB(V,D) = q W
S
B(V,D) + (1 − q)W
F
B(V,D) (31)
3.5 Non cooperative Critical market values
Now, to determine the non cooperative Nash equilibriums denoted by v(A) and
v(B), we analyse the relations among the strategic payoﬀs according to several ex-
pected market values V at time t0 and considering ﬁxed the invest cost D at time t0.
Therefore, we are able to determine the critical market values that delimite the several
Nash equilibriums.
First of all, we analyse the relation between the Leader and the Waiting strategy con-
sidering only the variable V and, to simplify the notation, we do not considering the
dividends to compute the derivatives. We can observe that:


































































for i = A,B, as it is shown in the proof (1).
Proof 1 We can observe that, when the information revalation ρ(X,Y ) and ρ(Y,X)




∂V raise because 2T − t1 > T. So,
assuming ρ(X,Y ) = ρ(Y,X) = 0, we can observe that p
+ = p and q
+ = q. More-




∂V > 0 for i = A,B.
Then, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 1 There exists, for each ﬁrm i = A,B, a unique critical market value
V
W
i that makes Li(V
W
i ) = Wi(V
W













B ), it results that:
Li(V ) < Wi(V ) for V < V
∗
W
Li(V ) > Wi(V ) for V > V
∗
Q





LA(V ) > WA(V ); LB(V ) < WB(V )





LA(V ) < WA(V ); LB(V ) > WB(V )
Now we analyse the relation between the Follower and the Simultaneous strategies.
Then, we can observe that:

























































∂V = qN(d1(P,T))kT[1 + p];
•
∂SB






for i = A,B. In this case we have that both derivatives are positive but the intersection

















P) and it results that:
SA(V ) < FA(V ) for V < V
∗
P












∂V then there exists a unique critical market value V
∗





S ) and it results that:
SB(V ) < FB(V ) for V < V
∗
S







∂V then SB(V ) < FB(V ) for every value of V .










It’s evident that in the simmetric case in which both players have the same success









By the Propositions (1) and (2), we are able to setting the several Nash equilibri-
ums v(A) and v(B) in case of no partneship with information revelation ρ(X,Y ) and
ρ(Y,X).
4 The Cooperation between A and B
In this section we analyse the cooperation between ﬁrms A and B that allows to
capture the whole information revelation and so to improve the R&D success prob-
abilities. In particular way we assume that the value achieved by the cooperation
can be trasferred from one player to the other. We show as the strategic alliance is
the joint best response to the non-cooperative alternative and so the equilibriums that
both ﬁrms obtain through the cooperation are Pareto-dominate all the non-cooperative
ones. As we consider two players, we denote by C(A∪B) the feasible set for the coali-
tion, namely is the set of outcome which can be obtained by the two players acting
together. The cooperation value is given by the sum of two ﬁrm’s payoﬀ using the
13whole information revelation ρmax deriving by two ﬁrms’ R&D investments. Both
players can agree upon several partnership contracts. For istance ﬁrms A and B can
share equitably the surplus of cooperation using the Shapley values:
ShA = v(A) +
C(A ∪ B) − (v(A) + v(B))
2
(32a)
ShB = v(B) +
C(A ∪ B) − (v(A) + v(B))
2
(32b)
where C(A ∪ B) − (v(A) + v(B)) is the surplus of cooperation. This solution looks
natural in the symmetric case p = q in which both ﬁrms have the same success proba-
bility otherwise, we can assume also asymmetric shares. For istance, we can split the
cooperation value C(A ∪ B) as:
PA = v(A) +
q
p + q
(C(A ∪ B) − (v(A) + v(B))) (33a)
PB = v(B) +
p
p + q
(C(A ∪ B) − (v(A) + v(B))) (33b)
We can observe that, if p = q, then Shi = Pi for i = A,B and the eﬃciency property
is satisﬁed as ShA + ShB = PA + PB = C(A ∪ B).
The cooperative information ρmax inﬂuences the Leader and Follower payoﬀs that we
denote by L
C
i (V ) and F
C
i (V ) for i = A,B, where C means the cooperative action.
The four possible cooperation strategies are:
• Both players decide to wait to invest at time t0. Then, their cooperation value
will be:
C(A ∪ B) = WA(V ) + WB(V ) ≡ WC(V )
• The ﬁrm A invests at time t0 while the ﬁrm B delays its decision at time t1.
The ﬁrm B obtains the overall information revelation ρmax:
C(A ∪ B) = L
C
A(V ) + F
C
B (V ) ≡ LFC(V )
• Simmetrically, the ﬁrm B invests at time t0 and the ﬁrm A delays its decision
at time t1. In this case it results:
C(A ∪ B) = F
C
A (V ) + L
C
B(V ) ≡ FLC(V )
• Both players decide to invest at time t0. In this case, their cooperation value
will be:
C(A ∪ B) = SA(V ) + SB(V ) ≡ SC(V )
The two-by-two matrix represented in the Fig.(3) summarizes the ﬁnal payoﬀs consid-
ering both the cooperative and the non cooperative strategies. The ﬁrst upper value
in each cell indicates the strategic investment opportunity for A at time t0, while the
second represents the ﬁrm B’s value. Moreover, in the lower part of each cell we de-








































Non−Cooperation  Non−Cooperation 
Non−Cooperation  Non−Cooperation 
Cooperation  Cooperation 
Cooperation  Cooperation 
Figure 3: Final payoﬀs at time t0
4.1 Cooperative Critical market values
The aim of two ﬁrm acting together is to improve their position compared with no
parteship and to reach a Pareto optimal solution. To realize this objective, we have
to determine the maximum value among the four cooperation strategies according to
several expected market values V at time t0. Therefore we compute the cooperative
critical market values that delimite the maximum payoﬀ C(A∪B). So it results that:
• WC(0) = 0; SC(0) = −2R;
• LFC(0) = −R; FLC(0) = −R;
When the market value V is equal to zero, both ﬁrms realize a loss equivalent to the
R&D investment made at time t0. Now, we analyse the relations among the four
alliance strategies. In particular way, we compute the derivatives without to consider



























































as N(a) > N2(a,b;ρ). Now we can remark that, if q = p, then it results LFC(V ) =
FLC(V ) as L
C
A(V ) = L
C
B(V ) and F
C
A (V ) = F
C
B (V ). So in this case both strategies
give the same value. But, if q > p, then we have that LFC(V ) > FLC(V ) and, if
q < p, then LFC(V ) < FLC(V ). The Tables (3) and (7) illustrate some numerical
examples how LFC(V ) > FLC(V ) when q > p.
So, to determine the maximun value, we consider the cooperation strategy in which
15the Leader is the ﬁrm with the highest success probability. Assuming that q ≥ p, we

































Proof 2 In the case p = q, it results that ρmax = 1 and p
+ = 1. After some manipu-



















2 + Bq < 0 (34)
where:

































− (2T − t1)N(d1(P,T))


















































we have that A > 0 and B < 0 and
−B
A > 1. So the disequation (34) is satisﬁed for
every value of 0 ≤ q ≤ 1. For the case q > p, we will give some numerical examples
illustred in the Table (9).
So, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 3 There exists a unique critical market value V
∗






LFC(V ) < WC(V ) for V < V
∗
C
LFC(V ) > WC(V ) for V > V
∗
C






∂V then there is not intersection between the functions LFC and SC.
Moreover, the intersection LFC and WC occurs before than SC and WC. So, in this
case, we have to consider only the critical market value V
∗
C given by Proposition (3)
and we can state that:
• If V < V
∗
C the maximum payoﬀ that both player can obtain by cooperation is
C(A ∪ B) = WC(V )
16• If V > V
∗
C the maximum payoﬀ attainable cooperating is
C(A ∪ B) = LFC(V )
In this case, the best strategic cooperation is the waiting policy (WC) until the ex-
pected market value V is below the critical value V
∗
C and, if V > V
∗
C, the optimal
strategy is the Leader-Follower one (LFC) in which the ﬁrm with higher success prob-
ability realizes the R&D investment at time t0 and the other player postpones its
decision at time t1. This is the best payoﬀ attainable through cooperation considering






∂V then there is intersection between the functions LFC and SC. So












G) and it results that:
SC(V ) < LFC(V ) for V < V
∗
G
SC(V ) > LFC(V ) for V > V
∗
G




G and so the intersection between LFC and
WC happens before than LFC and SC.











The ﬁrst part of inequality (35) is the reduction of slope to reach the critical market
value V
∗
C. It’s obviuos that if this reduction is faster then
∂(SC−LFC)






Considering to simplify the simmetrical case p = q such that p
+ = 1, the conditions
(35) holds if:
Uq
2 + Zq ≥ 0 (36)
where:





































































U < 0, Z > 0 and −U > Z. So the condition (35) holds for every value of 0 ≤ q ≤ 1.
For the case q > p we give some numerical applications summarized in the Table (9).
17So, using the Propositions (3) and (4) we observe that:
• If V < V
∗
C the maximum payoﬀ that both ﬁrms can obtain with cooperation is
C(A ∪ B) = WC(V )
• If V
∗
C < V < V
∗
G the maximum payoﬀ attainable through the cooperation is
C(A ∪ B) = LFC(V )
• If V > V
∗
G the maximum payoﬀ that both player can obtain cooperating is
C(A ∪ B) = SC(V )
In this case the optimal cooperation strategy is to wait to invest (WC) when the
expected market value V is below V
∗





maximum payoﬀ is obtained by the cooperation strategy Leader-Follower (LFC) and
ﬁnally, if V > V
∗
G, both players realize their R&D investment simultaneously at time
t0.
5 Real Applications
5.1 Assumptions and Inputs
To illustrate the concepts and equations presented, we develop some numerical
examples for the cooperative R&D game between ﬁrms A and B with the following
parameters and we focus on the several noncooperative and cooperative equilibriums
according to diﬀerent expected market value V deriving by R&D innovations:
• R&D Investment: R= 250000 $;
• Development Investment: D= 400000 $;
• Market and Costs Volatility: σv = 0.93; σd = 0.23;
• Proportion of D required for R: ϕ =
R
D = 0.625
• Correlation between V and D: ρvd = 0.15;
• Dividend-Yelds of V and D: δv = 0.15; δd = 0;
• R&D innovation parameter k = 0.30
• Expiration Time of Simple Option: T = 3 years;
• A and B success probability: q = 0.60; p = 0.55;
• Non Cooperative Information Revelation: ρ(X,Y ) = ρ(Y,X) = 0.40;
• Cooperative Information Revelation: ρmax = 0.9026;
The overall investment cost D is the exercise price for the development option. We
consider that the investment cost is proportional to market share, namely if the ﬁrm
market share is K0S0S then the investment cost will be K0S0SD. We assume that D
follows the Brownian motion process deﬁned in Eq. (1b).
The R&D investment R can be realized at time t0 or t1. If it is made in t0, then
R = 250000$, otherwise the investment R assumes the identical stochastic process of
D, except that it occours at time t1 and it is proportional to ϕ = 0.625 of D.
18Appropriately, we assume that the volatility of quoted shares and traded options is an
adequate proxy for the volatility of assets V and D.
According to ﬁnancial options, δ denotes the opportunity cost in holding the option
instead of the stock. So, in real option world, δv is the opportunity cost of deferring
the project and δd is the “dividend yield”on asset D. As at the beginning the cash
ﬂows are very low, we assume that δv = 0.15 and δd = 0.
The time to maturity T denotes project’s deferment option after that each opportunity
disappears and we adopt T = 3 years.
We assume also that ﬁrm A has an higher and more eﬃcient Know-How than ﬁrm
B and so, ﬁrm A’success probability is q = 0.60 while ﬁrm B’s one is p = 0.55 but
we suppose that the intesity of noncoopertive information revelation is equal for both
players and so we state ρ(X,Y ) = ρ(Y,X) = 0.40. Moreover, using the Eq. (7), it
results that the cooperative information revelation is ρmax = 0.9026;
Finally, we assume that the R&D innovation parameter k = 0.30 and we analyse the
two cases according to postponement time t1. We remark that t1 ≤
T
3 to allow the
development phase of R&D project and so, considering our adapted parameter values,
the maximum postponemet time t1 is 1 year.
5.2 Numerical application of First case
Assuming that the R&D investment decision can be delay at time t1 = 0.5 year,
we obtain, using the Eqs. (9a)-(9f), the following growth market coeﬃcients:
K0S0S = 1.8; K0S1S = 1.65; K1S1S = 1.50; K1S0S = 1.35; K0S = 0.90; K1S = 0.75




∂V and so, using the Proposition (3), we
compute the critical market value V
∗
C to determine the best cooperation strategy. For
our adapted number, it results that V
∗
C = 700037. So, if V < 700037 both players
decide to wait to invest and C(A ∪ B) = WC(V ) otherwise, if V > 700037 the best
cooperation strategy is the Leader-Follower one in which ﬁrm A invests at time t0 and
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Figure 4: First case
Now, to determine the partnership shares (ShA,ShB) and (PA,PB), we need to com-








S that allow to




W = 1028380; V
∗
Q = 1066240; V
∗
P = 1200470; V
∗
S = 1268650;
The Fig.(5) summarizes the relations among the four non cooperative strategies that
allow to determine the Nash equilibriums. We can observe that, if V < 1028380 the
waiting policy (WA,WB) is optimal in Nash meaning for both player at time t0, if
1028380 < V < 1066240 and 1200470 < V < 1268650 we have one Nash non coop-
erative equilibrium (LA,FB) in which the ﬁrm A, that has an higher success probabil-
ity, decides to invest in R&D earlier than player B, if 1066240 < V < 1200470 then
we obtain two Nash equilibriums (LA,FB) and (FA,LB) and at last, if V > 1268650
it results one Nash equilibrium (SA,SB) in which both player decide to invest simul-



























































































Figure 5: Relations among the non cooperative strategies with t1 = 0.5
Let us examine the partnership between ﬁrms A and B combining the cooperative
and non cooperative critical market values. The Tables (1) and (2) summarize the
non-cooperative payoﬀs of both ﬁrms considering the most notable several expected
market values. With these values we are able to compute the Nash-equilibriums v(A)
and v(B) that are listed in the second and third column of Table (4). Moreover the
Table (3) summarizes the cooperative values C(A ∪ B) according to four strategic
cooperations and, in particulare way, the bold type values are the maximum ones de-
riving by the optimal strategic alliance. Using the Eqs. (32) and (33), ﬁrms A and
B can split the cooperative value C(A ∪ B) by the Shapley (ShA,ShB) or the Asim-
metric (PA,PB) values that are shown in the Table (4). Comparing the cooperative
and the non cooperative values, we can observe that the partnership is favorable for
both players since each ﬁrm improve its payoﬀ deriving from non cooperative Nash
equilibrium. So we can state that the couples (ShA,ShB) and (PA,PB) are Pareto
optimals with respect to (v(A),v(B)). Only if V < 700037, and so V = 600000, then
the partnership does not add value to each player because the surplus of cooperation
WC(V )−(WA(V )+WB(V )) is equal to zero. So we can state that the waiting policy
is optimal for both players at time t0 also in cooperative alternative and ﬁrms A and
B prefer to wait better market conditions.
Finally, the Fig.(6) represents the overall situation assuming V = 1400000. In partic-
ular way, the black line denotes the the feasible set of partnership, namely it represents
all the combinations to split C(A∪B). But only the segment T-H is interesting, because
otherwise ﬁrms have the incentive to deviate from cooperation. In fact we can observe
that Shapley (ShA,ShB) and Asimmetric (PA,PB) values belong to the segment T-H.
Moreover, the Fig.(6) shows the four non cooperative strategies and in particular way
the Nash-equilibriums (SA,SB). We can notice that the segment joins the couples
20(SA,SB) and (ShA,ShB) has a 45
◦ slope since, by the Shapley value, A and B share
equitably (simmetrically) the surplus of cooperation C(A∪B)−(v(A)+v(B)). So, if
ﬁrms agree to split the surplus diﬀerently, then other solutions will be chosen on the
segment T-H.
Market Leader’s Value Follower’s Value Simultaneous Value Waiting Value
Value V LA FA SA WA
600000 -63344 41217 -68466 33244
900000 71204 110957 62390 96736
1050000 141889 154226 131135 137826
1100000 165819 169582 154408 152591
1250000 238525 217964 225119 199561
1400000 312391 269253 296958 249879
Table 1: Firm A’s ﬁnal payoﬀs assuming k = 0.30 and t1 = 0.5
Market Leader’s Value Follower’s Value Simultaneous Value Waiting Value
Value V LB FB SB WB
600000 -73104 37018 -78226 29024
900000 54409 101802 45595 86609
1050000 121398 142306 110644 124373
1100000 144077 156705 132666 138001
1250000 212981 202120 199575 181499
1400000 282984 250310 267552 228291
Table 2: Firm B’s ﬁnal payoﬀs assuming k = 0.30 and t1 = 0.5
5.3 Numerical application of Second case
If we assume now that t1 = 0.8 year, so the postponement time increases, using
Eqs. (9a)-(9e) we have that the growth market coeﬃcients are:
K0S0S = 1.8; K0S1S = 1.56; K1S1S = 1.32; K1S0S = 1.08; K0S = 0.90; K1S = 0.66










Numerically we compute that V
∗
C = 815710 and V
∗
G = 1796130 and, using the Propo-
sitions (3) and (4), we are able to state the optimal cooperation strategy. So, if
V < 815710 the best partnership strategy is to wait to invest and C(A∪B) = WC(V ),
if 815710 < V < 1796130 then both player choise the cooperation form LFC beneﬁc-
ing of information revelation ρmax and network externalities and hence C(A ∪ B) =
LFC(V ) and ﬁnally, if V > 1796130 then both player prefer to invest simultanoeusly
at time t0 and so C(A ∪ B) = SC(V ).
Now, to determine the partnership shares (ShA,ShB) and (PA,PB), we need to com-
21Market Leader-Follower Value Follower-Leader Value Simultaneous Value Waiting Value
Value V LFC FLC SC WC
600000 17412 12486 -146693 62269
900000 257854 248968 107985 183345
1050000 390083 378605 241780 262199
1100000 435386 422974 287075 290593
1250000 574220 558837 424694 381060
1400000 716600 698053 564510 478170
Table 3: Firms A and B cooperative payoﬀ assuming k = 0.30 and t1 = 0.5
Market Non-Coop. Non-Coop. Shapley Value Shapley Value Asim. Value Asim. value
Value V v(A) v(B) ShA ShB PA PB
600000 33244 29024 33244 29024 33244 29024
900000 96736 86609 133990 123863 135610 122244
1050000 141889 142306 194833 195250 197135 192948
1100000 165819 156705 222250 213136 224704 210682
1100000 169582 144077 230445 204940 233092 202294
1250000 238525 202120 305312 268907 308216 266004
1400000 296958 267552 373003 343597 376309 340291
Table 4: Shapley and Asimmetric values assuming k = 0.30 and t1 = 0.5
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Figure 7: Second case









tions (1) and (2). So, it results that:
V
∗
P = 1019230; V
∗
S = 1064060; V
∗
W = 1075210; V
∗
Q = 1120840;
The Fig.(8) shows the relations among the non cooperative strategic values and the
several Nash equilibriums. We can observe that, if V < 1064060, both players prefers
to wait (WA,WB) and to defer their R&D decision at time t1, if 1064060 < V <
1075210 we obtain two Nash equilibriums (WA,WB) and (SA,SB) and ﬁnally, if




























































































Figure 8: Relations among the non cooperative strategies with t1 = 0.8
As we have seen for the ﬁrst case, the Tables (5) and (6) include the non cooperative
payoﬀs considering the most notable expected market that allow us to compute the
Nash equilibriums v(A) and v(B) summarized in the Table (8). Moreover, in the Table
(7) are listed the partnership values C(A∪B) according to four cooperative strategies
and, in particular way, the bold type values are the maximum payoﬀs deriving by
best alliance. Both players can split the cooperative value C(A ∪ B) by the Shapley
(ShA,ShB) or the Asimmetric (PA,PB) values (see Eqs. (32) and (33) ) that are
shown in the Table (8). We can observe that, if V = 600000 and more generally
V < 815710, then the cooperation does not add any value because the cooperation
surplus WC(V )−(WA(V )+WB(V )) is equal to zero. So wait and see policy is optimal
also considering the cooperation way between A and B. Even if V = 1900000 and more
23generally V > 1796130, then the cooperative gain SC(V )−(SA(V )+SB(V )) is equal
to zero. So the simultaneous R&D investment at time t0 is preferable both in the
cooperative strategy and in the non-cooperative one.
Moreover, the Fig.(9) shows the overall situation when V = 1200000. Also in this case
we can remark as only the segment T-H is interesting for the splitting of cooperation
value C(A∪B) otherwise ﬁrms A and B have the incentive to deviate and to leave the
alliance. Also in this case we can observe that the segment joins the couples (SA,SB)
and (ShA,ShB) has a 45
◦ slope, since by the Shapley value A and B share equitably
(simmetrically) the surplus of cooperation C(A ∪ B) − (v(A) + v(B)).
Market Leader’s Value Follower’s Value Simultaneous Value Waiting Value
Value V LA FA SA WA
600000 -71689 36723 -68466 37169
900000 56844 90807 62390 94187
1040000 119817 121657 126501 127095
1070000 133495 128638 140425 134565
1100000 147230 135738 154408 142169
1200000 193398 160209 201411 168420
1900000 528189 356418 542253 380026
Table 5: Firm A’s ﬁnal payoﬀs assuming k = 0.30 and t1 = 0.8
Market Leader’s Value Follower’s Value Simultaneous Value Waiting Value
Value V LB FB SB WB
600000 -81449 33170 -78226 33138
900000 40049 83037 45595 85282
1040000 99575 111633 106259 115633
1070000 112504 118113 119434 122539
1100000 125487 124707 132666 129576
1200000 169129 147452 177142 153905
1900000 485595 330439 499659 351367
Table 6: Firm B’s ﬁnal payoﬀs assuming k = 0.30 and t1 = 0.8
5.4 Sensitivity analysis
In this section we study the eﬀects that the parameters k, t1 and p have on the
equilibriums and, in particular way, on the interval in which the optimal cooperation
strategy is LFC. We recall that only the partnership LFC allows to beneﬁt of a
cooperation gain deriving by the whole information revelation ρmax unlike the waiting
WC and the simultaneous SC policies.
As it is shown in the Table (9), we assume several combinations of k and t1 that give
the respectives growth market coeﬃcients K. Supposing that q = 0.60, we propose
24Market Leader-Follower Value Follower-Leader Value Simultaneous Value Waiting Value
Value V LFC FLC SC WC
600000 -2942 -9300 -146693 70307
900000 206691 195683 107985 179469
1040000 313413 299940 232760 242729
1070000 336830 322809 259860 257105
1100000 360419 345844 287075 271745
1200000 440190 423726 378553 322325
1900000 1032079 1001380 1041912 731393
Table 7: Firms A and B cooperative payoﬀs assuming k = 0.30 and t1 = 0.8
Market Non-Coop. Non-Coop. Shapley Value Shapley Value Asim. Value Asim. value
Value V v(A) v(B) ShA ShB PA PB
600000 37169 33138 37169 33138 37169 33138
900000 94187 85282 107798 98893 108390 98301
1040000 127095 115633 162437 150975 163974 149439
1070000 134565 122539 174428 162402 176161 160669
1070000 140425 119434 178910 157919 180584 156246
1100000 154408 132666 191080 169338 192675 167744
1200000 201411 177142 232229 207960 233569 206621
1900000 542253 499659 542253 499659 542253 499659
Table 8: Shapley and Asimmetric values assuming k = 0.30 and t1 = 0.8
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Figure 9: A and B equilibriums when V = 1200000
25three level of ﬁrm’s B success probability: p = 0.60 that give a cooperative information
revelation ρmax = 1, p = 0.55 with ρmax = 0.9026 and ﬁnally p = 0.50 with ρmax =
0.8165.
When t1 = 0.25, 0.50, we obtain the ﬁrst case in which the cooperation strategy LFC
is optimal for every V > V
∗
C. So we can observe that, when the R&D innovation
parameter k increases, then the threshold value V
∗
C decreases and hence the region
]V
∗
C,+∞[ enlarges. But, if the postponement time t1 increases, then the compound
european exchange option (CEEO) and the growth market coeﬃcients related to t1
decrease. In other words, the follower values decreases and so the critical market value
V
∗
C raises. Moreover we can observe that, if the probability p decreases and so also
the cooperative information ρmax, then the critical market V
∗
C increases.
Finally, when t1 = 0.75, 1, we have the second case and so the LFC strategy is bounded




G[. In this situation, the follower value decreases
and so the simultaneous R&D investment is proﬁtable for V > V
∗
G. We can note that,
when the postponement time t1 increases, then V
∗
C enlarges and V
∗
G decreases and




G[, in which the optimal strategy is LFC, goes down. While, if k














G go up. This means that, both the critical market value V
∗
C until
is better to wait and the threshold V
G from which is proﬁtable the simultaneous R&D
investment increase their values.
Moreover, we can note that V
∗
C is always smaller than V
∗
G.
k t1 p = 0.60 p = 0.55 p = 0.50
0.25; 0.25 ]686846, +∞[ ]719123, +∞[ ]755413, +∞[
0.25; 0.50 ]774857, +∞[ ]808293, +∞[ ]845441, +∞[
0.25; 0.75 ]876617, 2345271[ ]909670, 2520902[ ]945839, 2731506[
0.25; 1.00 ]994768, 1317283[ ]1024608, 1408848[ ]1056646, 1517632[
0.50; 0.25 ]421901, +∞[ ]440341, +∞[ ]460997, +∞[
0.50; 0.50 ]476010, +∞[ ]495107, +∞[ ]516256, +∞[
0.50; 0.75 ]537974, 1344397[ ]556746, 1438431[ ]577229, 1550730[
0.50; 1.00 ]609405, 786341[ ]626119, 837313[ ]644013, 897603[
0.75; 0.25 ]322244, +∞[ ]335757, +∞[ ]350864, +∞[
0.75; 0.50 ]363666, +∞[ ]377661, +∞[ ]393135, +∞[
0.75; 0.75 ]410794, 987646[ ]424509, 1053888[ ]439450, 1132786[
0.75; 1.00 ]464869, 590763[ ]476979, 627524[ ]489922, 670892[
1.00; 0.25 ]267910, +∞[ ]278827, +∞[ ]291016, +∞[
1.00; 0.50 ]302420, +∞[ ]313729, +∞[ ]326218, +∞[
1.00; 0.75 ]341490, 799562[ ]352549, 851599[ ]364582, 913457[
1.00; 1.00 ]386159, 485529[ ]395866, 514887[ ]406229, 549459[
Table 9: Interval ]V ∗
C,V ∗
G[ in which is optimal LFC cooperation strategy
266 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have proposed an R&D cooperation between two ﬁrms using the real
option approach to value their payoﬀs. By the alliance, the information revelation
is wholly revealed and captured by two players. Moreover, we have shown that the
unique cooperation strategy that allows to increase the information revelation with
respect to the non cooperative situation is the Leader-Follower strategy, in which one
ﬁrm realizes the R&D invesment at time t0 and other one postpones its decision at
time t1. In particular way, as the mutual information gain implies positive network
externalities, we have shown that the Leader role is assumed by the ﬁrm with the
highest success probability.
Finally, computing the non cooperative and the cooperative critical market values,
we are able to determine the range game in which is optimal every partnership strat-
egy and also the combinations to split the surplus of cooperation. Using the Shapley
value both ﬁrms split equitably the surplus but they can agree upon several partner-
ship contracts, such as the asymmetric shares PA and PB based on diﬀerent success
probability.
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